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Prickett: The Kirby Cop-Out

THE KIRBY COP-OUT: HOW STRICT ADHERENCE TO KIRBY’S
BRIGHT-LINE ATTACHMENT RULE UNDERMINES SIXTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Clayton Prickett

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine your family maintains the most prestigious art gallery in
America for the sole purpose of collecting and preserving profound
artwork. Although the gallery has received countless submissions from
artists, the only submissions that were truly profound and worth
memorializing happened to be oil paintings, with very few pastel
paintings. Then one day, an artist arrived with a sketch that resembled a
painting already in your collection, but nowhere near the quality of the
painting it was modeled after. Although the artist’s sketch would be
excluded solely because it was not as profound as the rest, you politely
inform the artist that your gallery only accepts oil paintings. Angrily, the
sketch-artist points to the pastel painting on the wall to counter your
claim, to which you respond, “That was an exception, but it is still a
painting nonetheless.” After realizing how easily you dismissed the
disgruntled artist, you announce a new rule: in order to be memorialized
in the gallery, the art must be an oil painting. From that day on, you
continue to reject artists for submitting subpar works of art, but if it is a
close call you rely on the bright-line rule announced to the sketch-artist
many years ago. The only downside to your rule is that sometimes you
have to turn away truly profound art, deserving to be memorialized, that
is not an oil-painting because you have relied on the rule to reject so many
others.
In Sixth-Amendment jurisprudence, the right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial provides an indispensable safeguard in the American
criminal justice system. Its rationale is straightforward: the average
American does not possess the expertise to effectively defend against
organized, well-funded prosecutorial forces that are designed to convict
those accused of a crime. The courts have recognized that in order to
preserve the right to counsel at trial, the right needs to be extended to
certain pre-trial confrontations. Similar to the hypothetical gallery, all of
the pre-trial confrontations happened to occur after formal judicial
proceedings had been initiated, but the confrontations were never deemed
a necessary condition to invoke the right to counsel. Then, in Kirby v.
Illinois, the Supreme Court of the United States made a novel decision.
The Court found that because case law showed that every extension of the
right to counsel in pre-trial confrontations has been needed after formal

339

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 10

340

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

judicial proceedings were initiated, formal initiation of judicial
proceedings is a necessary condition for the right to counsel to be
implicated. 1
Just as the hypothetical gallery owner could have rejected the sketch
for not being worth memorializing, so too could the Court have rejected
Kirby’s claim by holding that the Sixth Amendment did not apply during
criminal investigations.2 However, neither the gallery owner nor the Court
made this decision. Since the Court’s decision in Kirby, bright-line
attachment continues to be used as a way to dismiss claims that invoke
core Sixth Amendment principles, and meritless claims, alike. Turner v.
United States3 is the judicial equivalent to the gallery owner turning away
an artist’s submission that was worthy of being memorialized among
other profound artwork simply because of an arbitrary rule. The Sixth
Circuit denied the defendant in Turner the right to counsel because the
formalistic, bright-line attachment rule announced in Kirby continues to
trump the underlying principles of the Sixth Amendment. Instead of
determining whether pre-indictment plea negotiations implicate the rights
the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect, the majority used Kirby and its
progeny as a cop-out to quickly deny Turner the right to counsel instead
of implicating an in-depth Sixth Amendment analysis.
This Article examines Sixth Amendment caselaw and concludes that
the right to effective assistance of counsel should be extended to Turner,
and other similarly situated defendants, during pre-indictment plea
negotiations. Part II summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s decision denying
Turner’s right to counsel, the introduction of the attachment rule, and how
other Courts of Appeals have interpreted Kirby’s bright-line attachment
rule. Part III first analyzes why Kirby is a constitutional outlier that
undermines the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and has produced unsettled
caselaw in this area. Part III next discusses how the right to counsel,
properly understood, should extend to pre-indictment plea negotiations.
Lastly, this comment will show that even under a bright-line rule,
Turner’s right to counsel attached when the government extended a
formal plea offer. Finally, Part IV summarizes the main arguments
discussed in this Article and offers insight into the implications of the
Sixth Amendment attachment issue for pre-indictment plea negotiations.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part summarizes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Turner,
1. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion).
2. See id. at 690-91.
3. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).
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emphasizing the judges’ different viewpoints. Then, this Part traces the
development of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence by addressing the
underlying principles of why the right to counsel is crucial to the
American criminal justice system and highlighting the cases that have
extended the right to counsel to certain “critical stages” of the adversarial
process. Next, this Part discusses how the bright-line “attachment”
component was introduced in Kirby. This Part concludes by presenting
cases from circuits outside of the Sixth Circuit that deviate from Kirby’s
bright-line rule.
A. Turner v. United States
In March 2018, the Sixth Circuit reheard Turner, en banc,4 to decide
whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to pre-indictment
plea negotiations.5 This case arose from Turner’s motion to vacate his
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
negotiations for his federal charges.6
In October 2007, Turner robbed four Memphis-area businesses at
gunpoint and was later apprehended by a state police officer working in a
joint federal-state task force.7 In February 2008, a grand jury indicted
Turner on state aggravated robbery charges.8 Turner retained counsel and
the state charges were resolved through a plea agreement in March 2009.9
During the summer of 2008, an Assistant United States District Attorney
(“ADA”) informed Turner’s counsel that the United States planned to
bring federal charges for each of the four robberies.10 The ADA told
Turner’s attorney he would offer Turner a fifteen-year sentence for his
federal charges, conditioned on Turner accepting the offer before a federal
indictment was returned.11 Turner did not accept the plea deal before the
grand jury’s indictment was returned and the ADA withdrew the offer.12

5. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d
949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). This
Article addresses the state of the Sixth Circuit’s position on the right to counsel, and how the Sixth
Circuit’s approach should extend the right to counsel to pre-indictment plea negotiations.
6. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United
States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24,
2019). Although not addressed in this Article, the court also held Turner’s right to counsel was not
triggered by the state indictment because he committed two separate offenses, even though the essential
elements of the state and federal offenses were the same. Id. at 955.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The state plea-deal is not addressed in this comment.
10. Id. at 769.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Turner later fired his attorney, and the best deal Turner’s new attorney
could negotiate was a twenty-five-year sentence, which Turner
accepted.13
On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that the
right to counsel does not attach to pre-indictment negotiations.14 Turner
argued that based on the Supreme Court’s 2012 holdings in Missouri v.
Frye15 and Lafler v. Cooper,16 which recognized the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in post-indictment plea negotiations, the right to counsel
should also apply to plea negotiations that occur before a defendant is
indicted.17 The court rejected this argument, stating it is “firmly
established” that the right to counsel attaches only at or after formal
judicial proceedings are initiated.18 The Sixth Circuit refused Turner’s
argument because the “Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts
by criminal defendants to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to pre-indictment proceedings, even where the same proceedings are
critical stages when they occur post-indictment.”19 The “critical stages”
the court referenced were police lineups20 and interrogations:21 a right to
counsel exists in these stages only after formal charges are brought against
the defendant.22
The court also rejected Turner’s argument that other circuits extend the
right to counsel in pre-indictment adversarial confrontations.23 According
to the majority, only one circuit has implied the right to counsel extends
to pre-indictment plea negotiations, but that opinion was “nonprecedential and the issue of when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches was not before the court in that case.”24 The court noted that a
minority of circuits have discussed the possibility of extending the right
to counsel in pre-indictment proceedings, but since no circuit has
unequivocally extended the right to pre-indictment plea negotiations, the
court rejected the notion of a circuit split.25
13. Id.
14. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019)
15. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
16. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
17. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952.
18. Id. at 953.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See infra pp. 8-9,12-13.
21. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding the right to counsel did not attach to an
interrogation that took place the night the defendant was arrested for burglary and subsequently confessed
to a murder that occurred a year earlier).
22. Turner, 885 F.3d at 953 (internal citations omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 953-54 (citing United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154, 156-57 (3d. Cir 2016)).
25. Id. at 953 (citing Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995); see Perry v. Kemna,
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Judge Clay wrote separately to express his reluctance in following the
bright-line rule that denies Turner the right to counsel.26 Quoting his
opinion in United States v. Moody,27 Judge Clay stated:
“We do not favor this bright line approach because it requires that we
disregard the cold reality that faces a suspect in pre-indictment plea
negotiation. There is no question in our minds that at formal plea
negotiations, where a specific sentence is offered to an offender for a
specific offense, the adverse positions of the government and the suspect
have solidified.”28
While acknowledging the logic in Turner’s argument, the court noted
that Frye and Lafler did not expressly extend the right to pre-indictment
plea deals since the right to counsel had already attached.29
Judge Stranch’s dissenting opinion in Turner argued that the court
failed to perform its function while sitting en banc and that precedent did
not require the result reached by the majority.30 According to the dissent,
this case presented an issue that the Supreme Court has not yet
addressed.31 Instead of engaging in a fact-specific inquiry, the majority
followed an inapplicable bright-line approach and undermined existing
Sixth Amendment caselaw.32 For Turner, a pre-indictment plea deal
would be the only adversarial confrontation, yet the majority was not
willing to extend him the right to counsel.33 Lastly, the dissent points out,
the pre-indictment plea process was completely insulated from
constitutional review.34 Even a defendant such as Turner, who retained
private counsel, cannot bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.35
B. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused to receive
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions for his or her defense.36
The Sixth Amendment protects the fundamental notion that “if the
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be
356 F.3d 880, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bye, J., concurring) (collecting cases)).
26. Turner, 885 F.3d at 968 (Clay, J., concurring).
27. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000) (preceding Sixth Circuit decision
declining to extend the right to counsel in preindictment plea negotiations).
28. Id. at 615.
29. Turner, 885 F.3d at 969 (Clay, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 977 (Stranch, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 978.
33. Id. at 983.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 983.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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done.’”37 Until 1963, the right to be appointed counsel was only available
in federal criminal prosecutions.38 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, to require that all state courts provide counsel for indigent
citizens accused of a crime.39 The Court’s decision in Gideon extended
the reasoning of existing precedent and was based on the notion that in
the American adversarial system, any person who cannot afford to hire an
attorney cannot be given a fair trial unless an attorney is provided for the
accused.40 Further, the state’s spending of “vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of a crime” requires the
state to provide funding to protect indigent defendants’ constitutional
rights.41
In order to ensure Sixth Amendment protections, the Court in Gideon
applied a practical approach to “scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of
the accused” and determine whether presence of counsel is “necessary to
preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial.”42 In doing so, the Court
recognized that the spirit of the Sixth Amendment is that the average
defendant does not possess the legal skills to effectively defend against
the organized forces of the state and skilled prosecutors and therefore, in
order for justice to prevail, every American has the fundamental right to
be represented by counsel.43
1. Critical Stages that Require the Right to Counsel
The historical background of the Sixth Amendment suggests that the
core purpose was to assure assistance at trial.44 In a line of cases starting
with Powell v. Alabama, the right to counsel has been extended to critical,
pre-trial confrontations that “require[] the guiding hand of counsel” to
ensure the guarantee is not merely an empty promise.45 Further, the right
to counsel being extended to pre-trial confrontations resulted from
“changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have
tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered
parts of the trial itself.”46
The first prong required to trigger the Sixth Amendment right to
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (footnote omitted).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added).
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).
Id.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
Ash, 413 U.S. at 310.
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counsel is that the proceeding must be a critical stage.47 Determining
whether a hearing is a critical stage depends on “whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres . . . in the confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”48 The critical stage
has been extended from the right to counsel only at trial based on
pragmatic considerations that “the right to use counsel at the formal trial
(would be) a very hollow thing (if), for all practical purposes, the
conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.”49
To determine whether a pre-trial proceeding is a critical stage, the
Court weighs the “usefulness of counsel” and the “dangers to the accused
of proceeding without counsel.”50 Early Supreme Court decisions in
United States v. Wade51 and United States v. Ash52 illustrate how the Court
distinguishes between critical and noncritical proceedings. In Wade, the
defendant was arrested, appointed counsel, and subjected to an
identification lineup without notice to Wade’s attorney.53 The Court
found that during police lineups, there was a well-known risk of law
enforcement engaging in suggestive practices that influenced how the
witness identified the accused, which could not be corrected at trial.54 The
Court further found that once witnesses identified suspects in a lineup,
they rarely second-guessed themselves, so the identification issue was
often settled before trial.55 Since an attorney’s presence would have likely
prevented the use of suggestive practices that carry significant
implications at trial, the Court deemed police lineups to be a critical stage
in Sixth Amendment right to counsel analysis.56
Conversely, in Ash, the Court held that photo identifications were not
a critical stage because there were “substantially fewer possibilities of
impermissible suggestion.”57 Since photo identifications can be
reconstructed at trial and defense counsel can effectively cross-examine
witnesses to expose suggestive practices, the Court did not deem them to
47. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
48. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
49. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964) (alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted); see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988) (“we have defined the scope of the right
to counsel by a pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular
proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel”).
50. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298.
51. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (Gilbert was the companion case to Wade
that also addressed police identification lineups and was decided on the same day).
52. Ash, 413 U.S. at 300.
53. Wade, 388 U.S. at 219.
54. Id. at 229. (“[T]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor[.]”) (citation omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 237.
57. Ash, 413 U.S. at 324.
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be a critical stage.58
In Coleman v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a pre-indictment
hearing was a critical stage triggering the right to counsel.59 In that case,
the state of Alabama created a preliminary hearing to determine whether
sufficient evidence existed to warrant the state trying the case to a grand
jury and to set bail.60 The hearing was not required to indict an accused
and included procedural safeguards that barred testimony from hearings
in which the accused was not represented by counsel.61 The Court did not
address
whether
Alabama’s
unnecessary
and
effectively
nonconsequential hearing was considered a formal initiation of the
criminal process.62 However, the accused did not have the ability to
“realize the[] advantages of a lawyer’s assistance” before he was indicted,
which “compell[ed] the conclusion that the Alabama preliminary hearing
is a ‘critical stage.’”63 Specifically, during the hearing a defense attorney
could (1) cross examine witnesses to expose errors in the state’s case; (2)
impeach the state’s witnesses; (3) discover the case the state has against
his client; and (4) make influential arguments regarding early psychiatric
examinations or bail.64
In the companion cases Frye and Lafler,65 the Supreme Court found
that the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated during the plea-bargaining process. In Frye, the
prosecutor sent two plea offers to Frye’s attorney, but the attorney did not
advise Frye that the offers had been made and both offers expired without
the defendants knowledge that the offers existed.66 Frye eventually
entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to three years in prison, which
was greater than the plea deal Frye would have accepted but-for his
attorney’s failure to communicate the previous offer.67 In Lafler, the
prosecution offered to dismiss several of the defendant’s charges and
recommend a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months in exchange for

58. Id. at 324-25.
59. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
60. Id. at 8.
61. Id. at 8, 9.
62. See id. at 9. (“[I]n cases where the accused has no lawyer at the hearing the Alabama courts
prohibit the State’s use at trial of anything that occurred at the hearing, it does not follow that the Alabama
preliminary hearing is not a “critical stage” of the State’s criminal process.”).
63. Id. at 9-10.
64. See id.
65. The main difference between the Court’s decision in Frye and Lafler is that the latter addresses
“proper remedies” for violations, while the former does not. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138
(2012). Because remedies are outside the scope of this note, it will refer to the opinions collectively.
66. Frye, 566 U.S. at 138-39.
67. Id. at 139-40. (“Frye testified he would have entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor [90-day
sentence] had he known about the offer.”).
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a guilty plea.68 The defendant’s attorney convinced him that the
prosecution would not be able to prove a material element of the crime.69
The defendant lost at trial and received a mandatory minimum sentence
of 185 to 360 months.70
In sum, Frye and Lafler extended the scope of the right to counsel
“critical stage” to the plea-bargaining process.71 After these cases, the
Sixth Amendment extends to “pretrial critical stages” that are part of a
criminal proceeding where “defendants [could not] be presumed to make
critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”72 In Lafler, The Court
determined plea-negotiations were critical stages based on pragmatic
considerations.73 Specifically, “[t]he right to adequate assistance of
counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the
central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and determining
sentences.”74 Today’s criminal justice system is largely one of pleas,
which made protecting rights during plea negotiations more critical than
at trial.75
Once the Court established the right to counsel for plea-bargaining,
both defendants successfully demonstrated prejudice resulting from
counsels’ actions during the negotiation process.76 When an offer to pleabargain is made, “a defendant has the right to effective assistance of
counsel in considering whether to accept it.”77 If that right is denied, a
defendant must show prejudice to be entitled to relief.78 In order to show
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that
(1) “they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been
afforded effective assistance of counsel;” (2) the plea would not have been
cancelled by the prosecution or rejected by the trial court; and (3) “the
end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable” by
pleading to a lesser charge or receiving less prison time.79 With respect to
the third factor, “any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth

68. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 161 (2012).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 165; Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.
72. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 144-45 (“The art of negotiation is at least
as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it presents questions further removed from immediate judicial
supervision.”) (citations omitted).
73. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170.
74. Id.
75. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144; see also Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
76. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174; Frye, 566 U.S. at 150.
77. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168.
78. Id.
79. Frye, 566 U.S. 147.
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Amendment significance.”80
2. The Introduction of the “Attachment” Requirement
In Kirby, a plurality opinion denied the right to counsel for the
defendant during a police lineup that occurred before formal, adversary
proceedings had been initiated.81 The Court previously determined in
Wade82 that post-indictment lineups were critical stages where the right
to counsel was required by the Constitution.83 The defendant in Kirby was
arrested based on what was deemed a credible complaint from a victim of
a robbery, and evidence corroborating the complaint was found on the
defendant’s person when he was arrested.84 On the same day of the arrest,
police summoned the victim to the police station where he identified the
defendant as the man who robbed the victim two days earlier.85
The plurality briefly traced the history of the Sixth Amendment and
prior decisions to reach the conclusion that the right to counsel “attaches”
only at or after adversary proceedings had been initiated against the
accused.86 After noting the difference of opinion among members of the
Court in this area, the plurality stated that all of the cases involving the
right to counsel occurred during the arraignment or after formal charges
had been brought.87 The often-quoted language in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence comes from the Kirby plurality, in which the Court stated
the significance of a bright-line attachment rule:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point for our whole system of adversary
criminal justice system. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute and only then that the adverse positions of
the government and defendant have solidified.88

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the right to an
attorney had attached because it did not want to interfere with “routine
police investigation[s].”89 Lastly, the Court noted the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect the defendant’s
80. Id. (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2000)).
81. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion).
82. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
83. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 683.
84. Id. at 684.
85. Id. at 684-85.
86. Id. at 688.
87. Id. at 689; but see id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Expressing serious reservations about
the plurality reducing prior cases’ holdings, that protect the right to counsel, to support its formulation of
the bright-line attachment rule).
88. Id. at 689 (plurality opinion).
89. See id. at 690.
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constitutional rights during the police investigation.90
Five years after Kirby, the Supreme Court addressed the attachment
issue in Brewer v. Williams.91 In Brewer, an arrest warrant was issued for
the defendant based on his suspected involvement in a fourteen-year-old
girl’s disappearance.92 The defendant hired an attorney, turned himself in,
and agreed to be transported 160 miles to the county where the arrest
warrant originated.93 An agreement was made between law enforcement
officers, the defendant, and his attorney that no questioning would take
place while he was being transported.94 However, the officers violated
this agreement and elicited incriminating statements, which violated the
defendant’s right to counsel.95 The Court determined there was “no
doubt” adversarial proceedings had been initiated and the defendant’s
right to counsel was violated during the transport-interrogation.96 After
noting the difference of opinions on the scope of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court concluded the right had attached but did not make reference to
the bright-line attachment rule announced in Kirby.97
Although not referenced in Brewer, Kirby’s formalistic approach was
adopted by a majority of the Court in United States v. Gouveia.98 In
Gouveia, the defendants were already serving a prison sentence when they
became suspects in the murder of a fellow inmate.99 The defendants were
placed in administrative segregation for nineteen months until a federal
grand jury indicted them.100 At the arraignment proceeding, counsel was
appointed.101 The Gouveia defendants alleged, among other claims, that
their right to counsel was violated during the administrative
segregation.102 The Court held that no violation occurred because the
Sixth Amendment right had not attached yet.103 After highlighting the
rationale underlying the right to counsel, the Court relied on Kirby and
subsequent cases to reach its conclusion.104 Primarily, the Court focused
on the need for counsel when an accused is confronted by a professional,

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 691.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 393, 399.
Id. at 399.
See id.
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 188.
Id.
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organized adversary.105 Since appointing an attorney while the defendants
were in administrative segregation would not further the Sixth
Amendment’s purpose, the bright-line attachment rule was properly
invoked to deny the defendants the protections of the Sixth
Amendment.106
C. Circuits Deviating from the Bright-Line Attachment Rule
Several circuits have followed a more pragmatic approach – one that
does not exclusively rely on the formal initiation of judicial proceedings
– to determine whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
“attached” to a defendant in a particular case. Yet, the majority in Turner
denied the existence of a circuit split on this issue and dismissed the value
and reasoning of this alternative approach.107
In Roberts v. Maine, the First Circuit demonstrated this pragmatic
approach when it supported the proposition that a right to counsel may
attach before the formal charges are brought.108 In Roberts, the defendant
was stopped by the police for driving with a suspended license. He was
later arrested because the arresting officer suspected the defendant was
driving while intoxicated.109 Under the relevant Maine statute, the
defendant had the option to submit to or refuse chemical testing to
determine intoxication level. The defendant’s refusal, however, could be
used against him in subsequent judicial proceedings.110 The defendant
refused to submit to testing, was convicted at trial, and appealed his
sentence. He alleged the state’s refusal to allow him to consult with his
attorney to discuss whether to submit to testing violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.111
The First Circuit in Roberts ultimately concluded no Sixth Amendment
violation occurred, but not before discussing the Circuit’s position on the
“attachment” issue. Specifically, the court recognized that the right to
counsel might attach before any formal charges are made, before an
indictment or arraignment, if the government were to “cross[] the
constitutionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.”112 The
court noted the right would only attach in particular circumstances, but it
was not present here because the police were still performing their
105. See id. at 189.
106. See id. at 191.
107. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).
108. Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1995).
109. Id. at 1290.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1291 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
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investigatory function and the state had not crossed the “constitutionally
significant divide.”113
In United States v. Larkin, the Seventh Circuit reached a conclusion
similar to the First Circuit’s position in Roberts. There, the defendant was
incarcerated in a state penitentiary for his involvement in an armed
robbery.114 While incarcerated, and three months before he was indicted
by a federal grand jury, the government mistakenly compelled Larkin to
appear in a police lineup, prior to the grand jury compelling him to do
so.115 During the lineup, witnesses identified Larkin as the person
involved in the bank robbery.116 The government refused to grant Larkin’s
request for counsel to be present during the lineup, and the witnesses’
identification of the defendant in a pre-indictment lineup was almost
exclusively the basis for conviction at trial.117
On appeal, Larkin argued that the state denied him the right to
counsel.118 The lineup in question occurred three months prior to Larkin’s
indictment.119 The court began its analysis by finding that the right to
counsel “presumptively does not attach to pre-indictment lineups.”120 The
court further stated a “defendant may rebut this presumption by
demonstrating that, despite the absence of formal adversary judicial
proceedings, the government had crossed the constitutionally significant
divide from fact-finder to adversary.”121 The defendant made no such
showing the government changed its position and therefore did not rebut
the presumption.122 The court took special notice of the fact there was no
valid reason to deny Larkin’s request for counsel.123
Lastly, the Third Circuit has also applied a pragmatic interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent.124 In Matteo v. SCI Albion, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and several other charges.125
While Matteo was in jail, police taped two conversations between the
defendant and a friend who lent him a rifle used in the murder; Matteo
gave the friend explicit instructions about where to find the murder
113. Id.
114. United States. v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir. 1992).
115. Id. at 968.
116. Id. at 967.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 969.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 970 (“It bears repeating that ‘counsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on
the contrary ... law enforcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of taint[.]’” (quoting United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 (1967))).
124. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892-3 (3d Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 880.
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weapon.126 The defendant argued the taped conversation and subsequent
discovery of the murder weapon violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.127
At the time of Matteo’s telephone conversations, he had already been
arrested, incarcerated for more than a week, undergone preliminary
arraignment, and retained an attorney.128 After enumerating the standard
formal proceedings found in Kirby, the court stated that the right may also
attach at earlier stages.129 Specifically, the “crucial point is that the
defendant is guaranteed the protection of counsel” when he is faced with
the prosecutorial forces of organized society.130 The Third Circuit
determined that Matteo was confronted with organized resources of an
ongoing police investigation, and the officers were aware he was
represented; therefore, the court found that the right to counsel had
attached.131 Instead of using the bright-line test, the court conducted a
fact-specific inquiry to hold the right to counsel attached for Matteo.132
III. DISCUSSION
Cases involving the right to counsel have consistently produced tension
among Supreme Court Justices. In the decades following the Court’s
decision in Kirby, lower courts have been forced to decide whether the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment or the letter of the law should guide their
analyses. This Part first argues that the rigid attachment approach used by
the Turner majority is not as “crystal clear” as it suggested. Second, this
Part shows how other circuits’ Sixth Amendment analyses rebut the
Turner majority’s assertion that no circuit split exists on this issue. And
lastly, this Part argues that Turner’s right to counsel attached during preindictment plea negotiations through a proper understanding and analysis
of Kirby and its progeny.
A. The Caselaw is not as “firmly established” as the Turner
Majority Claimed
The dissent in Turner correctly noted the flaw in the majority’s
certainty in dismissing Turner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

126. Id. at 883.
127. Id. at 892.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 892.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 893.
132. See id.; see also United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying the FryeLafler analysis to pre-indictment plea negotiations).
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Contrary to the Turner majority’s assertion that caselaw is “firmly
established” in favor of a bright-line formal attachment rule, the court was
“wrong both about the clarity of [prior cases] and the substance [the
Supreme Court] find[s] clear.”133 Indeed, the formalistic approach
announced in Kirby could not garner support from a majority of Justices
and has continued to divide the Court in the four-decades since its
plurality opinion.
1. Kirby’s Foundation and Rationale
Kirby could not receive support from a majority of justices because the
plurality opinion exceeded the scope of the precedent it relied on. The
plurality in Kirby precluded a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during a pre-indictment lineup, despite the right being extended to postindictment lineups in Wade and Gilbert, decided just five years earlier.134
However, the two cases cited by the plurality do not hold formal judicial
proceedings are a necessary condition.135 Rather, Wade and Gilbert
“happened to involve postindictment confrontations” and “nothing at all
turned upon that particular circumstance.”136 Perhaps even more
indicative of how Kirby’s “attachment” rule deviated from previous
caselaw is how lower courts interpreted Wade and Gilbert. Since they
were decided, every United States Court of Appeals that was faced with
the issue had applied Wade and Gilbert to pre-indictment
confrontations.137
Kirby also undermined Supreme Court precedent by failing to engage
in a historical and factual analysis to reach its conclusion. In Wade, the
Court summarized how Sixth Amendment jurisprudence evolved since it
first extended the right to counsel for a pre-trial proceeding in Powell. 138
Wade concluded that Powell and its succeeding cases required the Court
to “scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused” and determine
whether “substantial prejudice to the defendant’s rights” would follow
133. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 980 (6th Cir. 2018) (Stranch, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rothgery v. Gillepsie County 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008)), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S.
LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).
134. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972) (plurality opinion).
135. See id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id.; see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 195 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[Wade]
illustrates how Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has turned not on the formal initiation of judicial
proceedings, but rather on the nature of the confrontation between the authorities and the citizen”).
137. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 704, n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Wilson v.
Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[S]urely the assistance of counsel, now established as an
absolute post-indictment right does not arise or attach because of the return of an indictment. The
confrontation of a lineup . . . cannot have a constitutional distinction based upon the lodging of a formal
charge.”).
138. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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without access to counsel.139 Kirby, decided only five years later,
concluded that Powell and its progeny stand only for the notion a person’s
right to counsel “attaches only at or after” judicial proceedings are
initiated.140 Any prior decisions that deviated from this narrow
interpretation were dismissed as being inapplicable or limited to its own
facts.141
Prior to Kirby, every “critical stage” occurred after formal judicial
proceedings began, which was not relevant until Kirby added the
“attachment” prong as a necessary condition that must be satisfied to
invoke the Sixth Amendment. In Stovall, decided the same day as Wade
and Gilbert, the Court summarized those cases to stand for the proposition
“that the confrontation is a ‘critical stage,’ and that counsel is required at
all confrontations.”142 Similarly, in Coleman, the Court found a “critical
stage” was sufficient to trigger the right to counsel.143 Coleman was
decided based on the spirit of the law: its reasoning flowed logically from
Powell through the Court’s decision in Wade.144 Specifically, the right to
counsel was extended to the defendant in Coleman because the “guiding
hand of counsel” was “essential to protect[ing] the indigent accused
against an erroneous or improper prosecution.”145 The Court never
premised its decision on whether the defendant had been indicted.
When Kirby was decided, it undermined the principled foundation of
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and reversed the logic of how claims
invoking the right to counsel are analyzed. The plurality reduced decades
of precedent centered around protecting the accused from the state in
criminal prosecutions with a single, conclusory statement.146 Powell and
its subsequent cases did not stand for the proposition that the right to
counsel attaches “only at or after the time” formal proceedings began.147
Rather, the caselaw “firmly establish[ed]” that if the accused is faced with
an organized prosecution and the right to counsel would help protect the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution exists to prevent against
injustice.148 The right to counsel in prior decisions was not conditioned
139. Id.; see also id. at 226 (“It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel's presence at
trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial.”).
140. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
141. Id. at 689 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
142. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
143. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10. (1970).
144. See id. at 7-9.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
147. Id.
148. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).
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on an arbitrary formality. Instead, the right was extended when the
defendant could show the state had shifted from investigator to an
accuser, because that is the sole purpose of the right to counsel.149 The
fact that these “critical stages” occurred at or after a formal proceeding is
wholly irrelevant. Moreover, Kirby was not cited by the majority when
the same issue was decided a year later because its reasoning was such an
egregious constitutional outlier.150
2. Kirby’s Application in Subsequent Cases
One year after Kirby, a majority of Supreme Court Justices in Ash
returned to the Powell-Wade Sixth Amendment analysis.151 In Ash, the
majority undertook an extensive historical analysis and traced the
developments in Sixth Amendment caselaw. First, it noted how changing
patterns of criminal procedure and investigation required extending the
right to events before trial.152 The right to counsel expanded “when new
contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the
right itself.”153 A notable absence from the Ash majority is the holding in
Kirby.154 Indeed, Justice Stewart’s separate concurring opinion was the
only mention of the supposed “firmly established” rule in the Supreme
Court’s comprehensive analysis of Sixth Amendment caselaw.155
Gouveia finally incorporated Kirby’s holding into its majority opinion
in 1984.156 The “narrow issue” in this case was whether the Sixth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel to prisoners in
administrative detention for alleged criminal involvement while under
detention.157 Again, the Court exaggerated Kirby’s weight in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence and applied Kirby to a fact pattern that does
not implicate the right to counsel.
First, the Court said Kirby was “confirmed” in subsequent cases,
which is a mischaracterization.158 Moreover, the Goveia majority
149. The plurality’s final word in Kirby specifically noted that petitioner’s rights would be better
protected by the fifth amendment because it prevents police from suggestive police lineups. See Kirby,
406 U.S. at 691.
150. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-13 (Analyzing the history of the Sixth Amendment,
citing twelve different Supreme Court cases and three commentators, but did not mention Kirby or the
‘formal initiation of criminal proceedings’ once).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 310.
153. Id. at 311.
154. Id. at 306-13.
155. Id. at 321. (Stewart, J., concurring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality
opinion).
156. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
157. Id. at 185, n.1.
158. Id. at 188.
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extended, without justification, the Court’s decision in Brewer.159 Brewer
first noted the conflict regarding various precedents on the attachment
issue.160 Then, because there was no reasonable argument to contradict
that the right had attached, the Court simply conceded that “[w]hatever
else it may mean, the right to counsel . . . means at least that a person is
entitled to the help of a lawyer at or sometime after judicial proceedings
have been initiated.”161 The second case cited by the majority was another
plurality opinion162; the other two citations offered applied Kirby but did
not decide whether the right could attach at an earlier point.163
Second, the Gouveia majority invoked Kirby in a case where the facts
did not warrant the sweeping conclusion that the right to counsel can only
be invoked after formal proceedings were initiated. In Gouveia, the
defendants were held for nineteen months in administrative detention
before being indicted.164 The defendants’ chief argument was a Fifth
Amendment due-process violation, their secondary argument was a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial violation, and their final argument was that they
argued a violation of the right to counsel.165 Yet the Court invoked Kirby’s
formalistic attachment rule when the rationale for the right to counsel was
not implicated by the case. Indeed, the majority rebuked the Court of
Appeals for even suggesting counsel could be useful:
[T]he Court of Appeals must have concluded, quite illogically we believe,
. . . that the inmate or his counsel could begin an effective investigation of
the crime within the restricted prison walls before even being able to
discover the nature of the Government’s case.166

Overall, the case law and application of the formal attachment method
used by the Court contradicts the underlying principles of the Sixth
Amendment, and bright-line attachment is found to be a necessary
condition only when dismissing superfluous attempts by defendants to
invoke the right to counsel.

159. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgement).
160. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“There has occasionally been a difference of
opinion within the court as to the peripheral scope of this constitutional right.”).
161. Gouviea, 467 U.S. at 193 (emphasis in original) (citing [Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398]) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgement).
162. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion).
163. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 193, n.3 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (satisfying Kirby’s
formal language where defendant was indicted and already had an appointed attorney); Moore v. Illinois,
434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (satisfying Kirby’s formal language where state conceded a preliminary hearing
was initiation of adverse criminal proceedings)).
164. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 183.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 191.
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B. Courts of Appeal Look Beyond the Bright-Line Attachment Rule
In Turner, the majority opinion unequivocally denied the existence of
a circuit split by mischaracterizing the decisions reached in other
circuits.167 In opinions cited in Turner, as well as others overlooked by
the majority, other circuits decline to extend the right to counsel to earlier
stages because the government had not yet solidified its position as an
adversary, not based on adherence to a bright-line rule.168 More
specifically, the reason other circuits have not adopted the bright-line rule
is because of their adherence to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence – not in
spite of it.
For example, the First Circuit’s decision in Roberts, which was cited
in Turner, did not rely on the bright-line attachment rule to deny Sixth
Amendment protections.169 The defendant claimed he was denied the
right to counsel when police refused to let him speak to his attorney before
submitting to a field-sobriety test.170 The defendant pursued a frivolous
argument that since refusing to take a sobriety test carried a mandatory
sentence, the right to counsel had attached, but the court concluded this
was not sufficient to change a normal investigatory procedure into an
adversarial proceeding.171
The court disposed the claim because the police had not yet crossed the
“constitutionally significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.”172
Indeed, the decision to bring formal charges depended on the outcome of
the sobriety test.173 Instead of rejecting Roberts’s strained attempt to
invoke Sixth Amendment protections under the bright-line attachment
rule, the First Circuit engaged in a principled analysis to determine
whether he was subject to intricacies of the adversarial system.174 More
importantly, the First Circuit found the investigation violated the Due
Process Clause without an unwarranted mischaracterization of the Sixth

167. Compare Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied,
No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).(“Because the Supreme Court has not extended the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to any point before the initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings, we may not do so”); with Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Overall,
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment appears to allow for few exceptions to the brightline rule that the right to counsel does not attach until the government initiates official proceedings by
making a formal charge.”).
168. See Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d
964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992).
169. Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1291.
170. Id. at 1290.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1291 (“Overall, Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment appears to allow
for few exceptions to the bright-line rule.”).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1290 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986)).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 10

358

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

Amendment’s attachment question.175
The Seventh Circuit followed a similar analysis in Larkin and rejected
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim. There, the government
mistakenly compelled Larkin to participate in a lineup prior to compelling
him to simply appear before the grand jury.176 Similar to the defendant in
Kirby, Larkin was subjected to a lineup before an indictment on his
federal charges were returned by the grand jury.177 Unlike Kirby, the
Seventh Circuit did not dispose of Larkin’s claim with a bright-line
attachment rule. Instead, the court concluded Larkin had a chance to rebut
the presumption that the right to counsel does not attach for preindictment police lineups.178 Since the defendant did not show that the
government “crossed the constitutionally significant divide,” the right to
counsel had not yet attached for him.179 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Larkin is a strong indication that circuits are divided the attachment issue.
The court expressly stated that if the defendant can demonstrate that the
government had changed its position from fact-finder to accuser, the right
to counsel exists “despite the absence of formal adversary judicial
proceedings.”180
Further, the Third Circuit found that the “crucial point is that the
defendant is guaranteed the protection of counsel from the moment he
‘finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal
law.’”181 In Giamo, the Third Circuit realized pre-indictment plea
negotiations were sufficient to trigger the right to counsel and applied a
Frye-Lafler analysis to determine whether the defendant’s rights were
violated.182 Similar to Turner, the defendant in Giamo was offered a preindictment plea deal that would dismiss charges carrying mandatory
minimum sentences, and he alleged his counsel was deficient in relaying

175. Id. at 1291.
176. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing United States v. Rosen, 487 F.Supp.2d 721, 733 (E.D. Vir. 2007) (“In addition to
these cases, several district courts have concluded that a right to counsel existed in pre-indictment plea
negotiations. United States v. Fernandez, 2000 WL 534449 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507
F.Supp. 1312, 1319-20 (D. Del.1981); United States v. Busse, 814 F.Supp. 760, 763 (E.D.Wis.1993));
(“These cases were not followed, however, in United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.2000), where
the Sixth Circuit reluctantly (and unpersuasively) concluded that the right to counsel does not attach in
pre-indictment plea negotiations, despite the fact that in the circumstances there presented, the adversarial
posture of the parties had clearly solidified because the defendant had been offered a specific plea
bargain.””) (emphasis added)).
181. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Kirby v.
United States, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
182. United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App’x 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2016).
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the prosecution’s offer.183 Unlike Turner, Giamo’s claim failed because
he could not show that he would have accepted the government’s offer:
not because his right to counsel had not attached yet.184
C. Applying a Reasoned Sixth Amendment Analysis to Turner’s
Claim
The crux of the Supreme Court’s attachment rule is that the
Constitution does not require a defendant be appointed counsel until the
government formally initiates a criminal prosecution. However, the
formal initiation of judicial proceedings is not a workable standard in
cases involving pre-indictment plea negotiations. First, this subpart
argues that, in Turner, the government shifted from its role as a fact-finder
to the Turner’s adversary. It applies the reasoning from Supreme Court
cases applying the bright-line attachment rule to show that the
government can shift to a defendant’s adversary without formal charges
being filed. Second, this subpart argues that formal attachment denies the
right to counsel at a stage in which the defendant’s rights are substantially
prejudiced. During pre-indictment plea negotiations, a defendant needs
assistance of counsel to navigate complex substantive and procedural
components of criminal law.
1. The Government Shifted from Fact-Finder to Adversary
In support of the court’s decision on the attachment issue in Turner, the
court improperly distinguished between critical stages that occur before
and after the right to counsel attaches. Specifically, the court cited
precedent that held no right to counsel exists during pre-indictment
lineups and interrogations, whereas the right is extended when those
events occur post-indictment.185
In Kirby and Moran, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel
does not attach for pre-indictment lineups and interrogations.186 The
underlying facts and timeline of the events in both cases are
fundamentally distinguishable from those in Turner. In Kirby, the police
arrested the defendant for a robbery he committed the day before and
brought the victim to the police station to identify the assailant.187 In
Moran, on the night the defendant was arrested, he admitted to
183. Id. at 157.
184. Id.
185. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 2018), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019
U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).
186. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
187. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 684-85.
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committing the murder and unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his
confession because no right to counsel attached.188 Clearly, the
government had not yet “committed itself to prosecute” in these cases.189
The pre-indictment lineup and interrogation both took place on the same
day of the arrest, and the police were deeply engaged in the fact-finding,
investigatory stage.
In Kirby, the Supreme Court expressly rejected interpreting the Sixth
Amendment in a way that interfered with a “routine police
investigation.”190 In Turner, when the ADA engaged in plea negotiations
with Turner prior to his federal indictment, there was no ongoing police
investigation and the government had already committed itself to
prosecuting.191 Turner’s arrest was the result of a joint state-federal task
force and had already been indicted on state charges resulting from the
same conduct.192 Within two days, the police obtained a typed, signed
confession from Turner, a positive identification by a witness in a lineup,
and video surveillance showing Turner committing these armed
robberies.193 Turner was incarcerated from the time he was arrested on the
state aggravated robbery charges until the subsequent plea deal with the
ADA was executed.194 In sum, when the ADA offered a plea deal before
Turner’s indictment, law enforcement’s investigation had concluded and
“the adverse positions of government and defendant ha[d] solidified.”195
The ADA made Turner a formal offer of fifteen years’ imprisonment
for charges that resulted from the same conduct as his state charges, which
supports the claim that the government had shifted from its fact-finding
function to Turner’s adversary.196 As argued in the Turner dissent,
prosecutors may only offer a plea deal if they plan to bring charges or
have a factual or legal basis to do so.197 The record did not indicate that
188. Moran v. Burbine, 475, U.S. 412, 431-32.
189. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
190. Id. at 698.
191. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United
States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018), en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24,
2019).
192. Id.
193. Turner Compl. No. 07136332 (Oct. 5, 2007).
194. Turner had four separate case numbers in Shelby County, Tennessee state court: Tennessee v.
Turner, No. 08 03612-08620401 (June 3, 2008) ($150,000); Tennessee v. Turner, No 08 01145-08606637
(Feb. 19, 2008) ($100,000); Tennessee v. Turner, No. 08 01146 07136332 (Feb. 19, 2008) ($200,000);
Tennessee v. Turner, No. 08 01147-07136332 (Feb. 19, 2008) ($200,000). His combined bond was
$650,000 and Shelby County public records do not indicate it was posted in the financial section, though
it has a record of Turner paying other court costs.
195. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 698.
196. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952; see Turner 885 F.3d at 954-55.
197. Turner, 885 F.3d at 981 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (citing Cf. Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution Function, Standard 2-5.6(g) (4th ed. 2015; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27. 430 (2017)).
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police undertook any additional efforts to investigate Turner’s crimes, but
even if police continued to investigate, extending a formal plea offer
“signals an individual has transitioned from a mere suspect to an
accused.”198 Indeed, had Turner promptly accepted the pre-indictment
plea deal, his conviction would have been based solely on facts already
possessed by the police and presented to the ADA.
The logical conclusion is that the right to counsel attached when the
ADA presented a formal plea offer to Turner. If Turner’s case was
presented to the Courts of Appeals mentioned above, it is likely that
Turner’s facts would be sufficient to cross the “constitutionally
significant divide” that triggers the right to counsel.199 The First and
Seventh Circuits cast doubt on the strict adherence to a bright-line
attachment rule by interpreting Supreme Court decisions to allow the right
to attach before initiating official proceedings.200 The reason for rejecting
the defendants’ claims that their right to counsel had attached was that the
police were still heavily involved in their respective investigations. In
these cases, the facts controlled the analysis—not strict adherence to
bright-line rules.
2. The Consequences of Pre-Indictment Plea Negotiations Require
Effective Assistance of Counsel
Even in Supreme Court cases relying on the bright-line attachment rule,
whether the government’s adverse position is solidified and the accused
is “immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal
law” is still relevant in the analysis.201 When the Court finds that the right
to counsel has not yet attached in pre-indictment proceedings, the reason
is largely because the two previously stated factors were not satisfied.202
However, pre-indictment plea negotiations are fundamentally
distinguishable from other pre-indictment proceedings because of their
exposure to the intricacies of the legal system and their ability to
definitively resolve criminal charges against an accused.
For a criminal defendant to meaningfully evaluate a pre-indictment
198. Id.
199. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992).
200. Id.; Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290 (1st Cir. 1995).
201. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689 (1972)).
202. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (holding a pre-indictment lineup, that occurred the same
day as the defendant’s arrest was insufficient for right to counsel to attach); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986) (holding the right to counsel did not attach to an interrogation that took place the night the
defendant was arrested for burglary and subsequently confessed to a murder that occurred a year earlier);
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (holding no right attached during 19 month administrative
detention).
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plea deal, he or she would have to understand the charges, potential
punishment, potential defenses, the strength of the government’s case,
and the risks of proceeding to trial.203 In Turner’s case, “[e]valuating the
offer also required fluency in the complexities of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, a task that is challenging even to experienced
attorneys.”204 When plea-negotiations take place before a formal
indictment, the accused is not invoking the Sixth Amendment to provide
a pre-indictment private investigator,205 interfere with the police’s
investigatory function,206 or even prevent illegitimate law enforcement
practices before an indictment.207 Rather, the accused is seeking effective
assistance of counsel to navigate the complex legal system that “is for the
most part a system of pleas.”208
Denying the right to counsel during pre-indictment plea negotiations
preclude effective assistance during the “accused’s only adversarial
confrontation.”209 Pre-indictment plea negotiations take place in at least
twenty-percent of federal criminal prosecutions.210 In federal court, one
of every five criminal defendants’ “exposure to the criminal justice
system” starts with the prosecutor and “close[s] in the prison system.”211
And although pre-indictment plea deals are becoming increasingly more
common, the majority in Turner “insulates those confrontations” from
constitutional protections and review.212 This is not meant to discount the
desirability of these plea bargains; rather, it is to ensure that the
government cannot streamline its criminal prosecutions by taking
advantage of those who are unaware of their rights.
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari on Turner to correct
the Sixth Circuit’s outdated interpretation of the right to counsel. The
right to counsel should attach when a prosecutor extends a formal plea
203. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 981 (6th Cir. 2018) en banc, cert, denied, No. 18-106,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019). (Stranch, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 191 (“[O]ur cases have never suggested that the purpose of the right to
counsel is to provide a defendant with a preindictment private investigator[.]”) (Emphasis added).
206. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985) (“[T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges
as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained,
simply because other charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest
in the investigation of criminal activities.”).
207. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691 (“When a person has not been formally charged with a criminal offense,
[the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] strike[] the appropriate constitutional
balance between the right of a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures . . . and purposeful
investigation of unsolved crime.”).
208. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
209. Turner, 885 F.3d at 982 (Stranch, J., dissenting).
210. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *4, n.1, Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018)
en banc, No. 18-106 (July 20, 2018).
211. Turner, 885 F.3d at 982 (Stranch, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 983.
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offer to an accused, even if he has not been formally indicted. Upon a
finding that the right to counsel attaches after the government extends a
formal plea offer, the Frye-Lafler analysis used for post-indictment plea
deals would be readily transferrable.
Under the Frye-Lafler test, the Sixth Circuit, on remand, would likely
have found that Turner received ineffective assistance of counsel. First,
he would be able to show that he would have accepted the pre-indictment
plea offer but-for the deficient assistance of his counsel. Turner accepted
his state plea deal.213 And he promptly accepted the post-indictment plea
offer negotiated by his new attorney, despite receiving a longer prison
sentence. 214 The prejudice prong of the Frye-Lafler anaylsis would have
also been satisfied because Turner received ten additional years’
incarceration as a result of not accepting the ADA’s initial plea. 215
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in Turner
improperly deferred to Kirby’s bright-line attachment rule and precluded
Turner from bringing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during
pre-indictment plea negotiations. Contrary to the Turner majority’s
assertion that Kirby requires the conclusion reached by the court,
substantial caselaw exists to demonstrate the existence of a circuit split
and reluctance among the lower courts to use the bright-line rule as a copout when deciding close cases of whether the right to counsel attached.
The Sixth Amendment, properly understood and applied, should extend
to prevent the accused from having to accept a pre-indictment plea deal
without the protection of counsel in order to avoid a harsher prison
sentence from a post-indictment plea with counsel.
Pre-indictment plea negotiations operate in a constitutional “blindspot” between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. The negotiations take
place after the Fifth Amendment’s protections end and before the Sixth
Amendment’s protections begin. Since the Court refuses to act in the
interest of the accused, the accused is not afforded any protection from
the constitution against the organized forces of the government. When the
accused is presented with a formal plea offer – a fixed sentence for
pleading guilty to specific charges – the interest served by providing

213. Turner v. United States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff’d on reh’g, Turner v. United
States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220
(June 24, 2019).
214. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc), cert, denied, No. 18-106,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 4220 (June 24, 2019).
215. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 157 (2012) (quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
203 (2000)) (any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.
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counsel to the accused is substantial, and a countervailing governmental
interest has yet to be presented to the Court. Instead, the government relies
on the Court’s deference to a bright-line attachment rule as a cop-out, a
bright-line rule that should be overturned.
As a result of the Supreme Court denying certiorari on Turner’s
attachment question, lower courts will continue to deprive the accused of
the right to counsel during this critical stage. As prosecutors utilize new
means to secure guilty pleas prior to formal indictment, the bright-line
attachment approach is inapplicable and will deny the right to effective
assistance of counsel at the only adversarial stage of the criminal process.
By continuing to rely on this cop-out, the Court leaves the accused
without the resources necessary to face the government in our adversarial
system, and the accused is tasked with representing him or herself against
the United States government without the slightest chance of prevailing.
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